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Abstract The objective of this paper is to check measures for explanatory power of central bank
independence (CBI) in a series of econometric tests. Measures of central bank autonomy offer
a useful expression of the extent to which a central bank is able to keep the government away
from inﬂuencing a change in the inﬂation rate. The more a measure represents this idea, the eas-
ier one can ﬁnd a relation between the CBI value and the inﬂation rate. Results of estimations
show that proxies by Grilli et al. (1991) are strong regressors of inﬂation rate, contrary to those
by Cukierman et al. (1992). Moreover, estimation results challenge the belief that divergences
in CBI-inﬂation rate estimations are due to differences in institutional features across samples
of countries, not to differences in legal proxies of central bank independence. Already results
from a homogenous group of industrial countries indicate that some indices perform “better”
than others.
Keywords Central bank independence, political autonomy, economic autonomy, institution,
estimation
JEL classiﬁcation E58, E52 
1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to check measures for explanatory power of central bank
independence (CBI) using a series of econometric tests. These tests are in the spirit of
the belief that each institutional improvement of central banks always aims to obtain
more efﬁcient monetary policy. Therefore, as found by other studies, it is believed
that the main, and perhaps the only, reason to introduce higher degree of central bank
independence is to help achieve a lower inﬂation rate. This paper’s title, “Quest for the
Best”, seems to suggest a winner of this “competition”; that is, the most accurate and
adequate measure. However, it is already understood that all measures are vulnerable
to criticism. Therefore, there really is no “perfect” outcome for this experiment.
Another aim of this paper is to challenge Cukierman’s (1992, p. 425) conclusion
that: “any divergences in results between our full sample and that of the ATC [Alesina,
and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini studies] is due to differences in institutional fea-
tures across the samples of countries, rather than to differences in the legal proxies of
CB independence.” Although one can agree with Cukierman that institutional deve-
lopment of countries matters, it may be possible to see that some measures are even
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stronger predictors of inﬂation rate than others that have the same sample under inves-
tigation.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief theoretical back-
ground covering simple justiﬁcation for central bank independence. The description
of the model, methodology of estimation and the type of data used can be found in
Section 3, which is followed by the estimation results (Section 4). Section 5 concludes
the paper, with additional information provided in the Appendix.
2. Theoretical background
The theoretical and empirical discussion on central bank independence describes the
phenomenon in a two ways. The ﬁrst characterizes determinants of central bank inde-
pendence, and focuses on required institutional development of the country that helps
the bank succeed in obtaining monetary goals. The second method attempts to quantify
degrees of CBI around the world and search for a relation between a level of CBI and
economic variables.
Determinants of central bank independence can be affected by the nature of politi-
cal and legal institutions, as well as by a nation’s accepted practice, culture and person-
alities. Among political and economic determinants, one can mention the role of the
equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment, the stock of government debt, political
instability, the quality of supervision of ﬁnancial institutions or ﬁnancial and public
opposition to inﬂation. As Eijfﬁnger and de Haan (1996) explain these determinants
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may partly overlap.
Some studies have presented and proven the hypothesis that the type of political
system and its structure determines the presence and degree of central bank indepen-
dence. First, Moser (1999) shows that the legal CBI is signiﬁcantly higher in those
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, where
extensive checks and balances were present. Moreover, countries with checks and
balances have recorded a stronger negative relation between legal CBI and average in-
ﬂation rate. Similarly, Keefer and Stasavage (2001) empirically show that central bank
independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries with
multiple veto players in government. There is also an indirect effect of checks and bal-
ances. The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure
protections supported by political checks and balances.
The importance of ﬁnancial and public opposition to inﬂation is studied by Posen
(1993a, 1993b), who ﬁndsthata centralbank issuccessful inits anti-inﬂationarypolicy
when there is a coalition of interests, like the ﬁnancial sector, that can protect this aim.
On the other hand, the public’s preferences, or an accepted practice in a country, seems
to be as important as previously mentioned determinants of central bank independence.
Athoroughinvestigationofthelinkbetweensocieties’aversiontoinﬂation, acountry’s
inﬂation performance and the degree of central bank independence can be found in
Hayo (1998). According to this study, public acceptance of the need for price stability
may be as important as having independent monetary authorities.
Along the work on CBI determinants, a rather extensive research was held on quan-
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tifying the degree of independence among the world’s central banks. This part of re-
searchstartedinthelate1980swiththeworkofBadeandParkin(1988), andlaterGrilli
et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992). Recently, Eijfﬁnger and de Haan (1996) and
Arnone et al. (2006), among others, provide a detail survey of CBI measures, whereas
Klomp and de Haan (2010) present a meta-analysis of publications based on CBI stu-
dies.
The idea of independence measures lies in identifying presence of certain CBI at-
tributes that may deﬁne this phenomenon. Legal measures are constructed of attributes
from several groups relating to a central bank’s governor, policy formulation, policy
objectives, ability of government to borrow from the central bank and external mone-
tary relations of the central bank. A major assumption behind these measures depends
on attaching a numerical value to selected central bank institutional factors, which
constitute the power and ability to conduct monetary policy.
Despite the same methodology, these indices differ in the choice of CB attributes
and their weighting, and sometimes in the ﬁnal degree of CBI. The measures’ con-
struction methodology have been under severe criticism, especially by Forder (1999,
2005), who points out that many CBI indices have, in fact, different understanding of
what could be the key issue of independence. Brumm (2000) criticizes the measure of
“actual” independence (turnover rate-TOR), and explains that it might not consider the
possibility that a central bank governor stays at his post for a long period (thus giving
the impression of a high level of CBI) simply thanks to an agreement with political
leaders. In a comparison of two indices, a legal proxy by Cukierman et al. (1992) and
Grilli et al. (1991), Mangano (1998) ﬁnds that these two indices disagree with each
other in nearly 60% of all countries included, in the area of an attribute concerning
central bank’s ability (legal permission) of purchasing government debt in the primary
market. There are few examples of inconsistencies among measures, such as the case
of the National Bank of Poland, which scores a high value according to the legal mea-
sure of independence but the central bank is rather dependent on the government when
the turnover rate of governors, thus another measure, is considered.
Quantifying degrees of central bank independence allows searching for its relation
with macroeconomic variables, especially with inﬂation rate. The 1990s witnessed
a series of institutional changes in central banks, aiming at ensuring that monetary
authorities are the sole policymaker, immune from political pressure. At the same
time, over the past ﬁfteen years, global inﬂation has dropped from 30% to 3% (based
on historical data from IMF’s World Economic Outlook, available at www.imf.org).
From this evidence, one may assume that a higher degree of independence is conducive
to a lower level of inﬂation. On the other hand, a high rate of inﬂation is likely to result
in a lower level of independence. Therefore, as Cukierman (1992, p. 427) explains it is
“conceivable that there is a two-way causality between inﬂation and the actual degree
of CB independence.”
Empirical evidence of such causality is also given by Cukierman (1992, p. 429),
who shows evidence of a two-way Granger causality between inﬂation and CB inde-
pendence, as proxied by governors’ turnover. Posen (1993a) argues that the relation-
ship “higher degree of CBI—lower rate of inﬂation” is not causal, and may be caused
134 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 5, no. 2How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inﬂation
by society’s preferences for low and stable inﬂation. Posen was criticized by de Haan
and Van’t Hag (1995), who show that Posen’s results are conﬁrmed only when the
Cukierman’s legal indicator is used.
Most empirical literature considers central bank independence an exogenous vari-
able and focuses on explaining some elements of a country’s economic performance.
For example, cross-country data for developed countries show a negative relation be-
tween a degree of central bank independence and inﬂation, but no correlation with out-
put or employment (e.g., Bade and Parkin 1998; Grilli et al. 1991; Cukierman 1992,
ch. 19; Eijfﬁnger and Schaling 1993). These studies have been criticized for using a
bivariate type of regressions by Campillo and Miron (1997). Their signiﬁcant contri-
bution was to include several other explanatory variables like openness, debt-to-GDP
ratio or exchange rate regime, along with a untypical economic variable of political
instability. The work of Campillo and Miron, among other authors such as Eijfﬁnger et
al. (1998), Sturm and de Haan (2001) and many more, inspired the following analysis.
3. Methodology
The methodology used in this analysis differs from what is normally presented in pa-
pers on this topic. Previous studies relied strongly on cross-country estimations done
with a reference to a speciﬁc point of time, generally connected to the calculation of
the level of central bank independence. These studies do not consider the possibility
that the degree of CBI would change over time. The cross-country analysis is thus
informative only to the limit of the comparison among countries.
The methodology used in this study “upgrades” previous attempts with the analysis
of both cross-section and time-series, hence giving a panel data approach. This is
possible thanks to the popularity of the CBI concept that led to recalculation of several
measures, updated with the new data on central bank legislation. The composition of
data suggests the use of the panel data method of analysis with ﬁxed-effects estimator.
3.1 On additional tests
A series of verifying tests can be used either to test regressors (i.e. CBI measures)
or to test models. A stepwise selection method can be used as an example for testing
explanatory power of independence indices, once they are treated as the only regressors
in the model. On the other hand, alternative models (when only one CBI measure is
included to the model and stands next to other types of independent variables) can be
tested against each other with, for example, tests for non-nested models.
3.1.1 Stepwise selection
A large number of CBI indices allows using a regression with the stepwise selection
method. This method “evaluates each variable in turn on the basis of its signiﬁcance
level and accumulates the model by adding or deleting variables sequentially” (Greene
2000, p. 334). In the “forward” method, an initial model is deﬁned that contains only
the constant. Then, the ﬁrst “best” predictor is chosen from those available. It is done
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by choosing the predictor that has the highest simple correlation with the outcome. The
procedure repeats until all “best” predictors are chosen.
Due to several drawbacks, this procedure is treated here as an additional supple-
mentary test. Its major assumption in this analysis is to treat CBI measures as the only
independent variables. High and signiﬁcant correlation coefﬁcients, the factors that
lead to excluding this method, have been received on a limited scale. The method’s
criteria were based on probability of entering F 0.50, and probability of removing
from regression F  0:100.
3.1.2 Testing for non-nested models
In empirical investigations of the relation between the degree of CBI and inﬂation
rate, it is common to have several different models that claim success as empirical
explanations of this phenomenon. The key element that often changes is the deﬁnition
of central bank independence. The idea that drives this study, that is, collecting and
comparing several CBI indices, creates a unique opportunity to test and cross-validate
these models.
In the case of two models explaining the same phenomenon, when neither of them
is a special case of the other, one talks about non-nested models. For example, mon-
etarists would emphasise the role of money in explaining changes in GDP, whereas
Keynesians may explain them by changes in government expenditure (Gujarati 2003,
p. 530). In the case of CBI analysis, the model is often the same, with the exception of
the deﬁnition of CB independence. The logic of using a particular CBI index can there-
forebeexplainedwithtestsfornon-nestedregressionmodels. Relatingtothisproblem,
Atkinson (1969) emphasizes that it is important to distinguish a few questions relevant
to this problem. For example, if one model is already in use as a predictor, is there
any evidence of a departure from it in the direction of a second model? Once a CBI
measure is changed, is there any evidence that the models ﬁt signiﬁcantly differently
to the data?
Recent developments in testing non-nested hypotheses have been structured around
a common idea of the “encompassing principle” (Mizon and Richard 1986). This prin-
ciple directs attention to whether a maintained model can explain the features of its
competitors (Greene 2000, p. 302). Gujarati (2003, p. 530–533) describes two approa-
ches to testing non-nested hypotheses. The discrimination approach involves choosing
between two (or more) models based on criteria such as the following: R2; adjusted
R2; Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), proposed by Akaike (1973); Schwarz infor-
mation criterion (SIC), proposed by Schwarz (1978). The alternative method is the
discerning approach that includes the encompassing F-test and Davidson-MacKinnon
J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1982). In the method that the J-test provides, the
idea is that if one model is the correct model, then the ﬁtted values from the other
competitive model should not have explanatory power, when estimating that model.
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3.2 Data
The key element of all of the following estimations is the measurement of central bank
independence. There are approximately seventeen original CBI measures:
BP (Bade and Parkin 1988); Alesina (Alesina 1988); GMTO (Grilli et al. 1991),
index that divides into political (GMTP) and economic (GMTE) independence; LVAU
(LVAW for weighted measure): legal measure constructed by Cukierman (1992) and
Cukierman et al. (1992), and its modiﬁcation for transition countries LVES by Cukier-
manetal.(2002); TORandVUL:turnoverrateofgovernorsandthemeasureofvulner-
ability, Cukierman et al. (1992) and Cukierman and Webb (1995); ES (Eijfﬁnger and
Schaling 1993); Distance (Fratianni and Huang 1994); OPCBI (Eijfﬁnger and Schal-
ing 1995); CBI-DF and SIB (Loungani and Sheets 1997); CBI-Account (Lybek 1999);
Freytag (Freytag 2003); CBI-Index (Freytag and Masciandaro 2005); PROB (Krause
and M´ endez 2007).
Table 1 presents a summary of differences in the construction of a few measures.
Most columns indicate whether the particular attribute of central bank independence
was included in selected measures. The last column, however, is based on a survey
conducted among central bankers by Fry et al. (2000), which ranks the characteristics
of central banks autonomy according to importance (where 1 is “the most important”
and 6 is “the least important”).
Some measures have been uniﬁed and connected by deﬁnition. Hence, there is no
measure calculated by Arnone et al. (2006), but their work is used as the update for the
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT) index (Grilli et al. 1991). Similarly, one may
ﬁnd measures of the turnover rate of governors (TOR) calculated by many authors that
help to build a long data set for this index. All sources of data have been acknowledged
and included in the references.
Deﬁning a dependent variable may cause as many problems as ﬁnding a suitable
collectionofexplanatoryones. Manypreviousstudiesusedtheaverageannualinﬂation
rate as the dependent variable and others introduce different deﬁnitions. For example,
Cukierman(1992)chosetouseadepreciationintherealvalueofmoney, deﬁnedasd =
inﬂationi;t=1+inﬂationi;t (in this study it is also called a “transformed” inﬂation rate).
He claimed that there are several explanations for doing so. First, it better represents
the real losses on the holding of money balances. Second, it moderates the effect of
outliers with very high levels of inﬂation. Moreover, rescaling values of inﬂation rate
according to this procedure helps to ameliorate potential heteroscedasticity (as pointed
out by J´ acome and V´ azquez 2005). Eijfﬁnger et al. (1998) performed a sensitivity
analysis and, besides the mean inﬂation, they included interchangeably elasticity and
variance of inﬂation.
The crucial condition for panel data (especially when the ﬁrst-differencing method
is used) is that there must be variation of explanatory variables across time. This fails if
the dependent variable does not change over time for any cross-sectional observation,
or if it changes by the same amount for every observation (Wooldridge 2003, ch. 13).
It is the case in terms of few CBI measures, which were calculated once and do not
change over time.
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4. Empirical results
The idea of an existing relation between central bank independence and inﬂation rate
originated from studies focusing on a group of major, often OECD, economies. Once
this phenomenon was established, further research concentrated their interest on other
groups of countries, keeping in mind varying levels of development among them.
While explaining levels of inﬂation rate over time, it seems rational to differentiate
all causes according to the type of economy. Therefore, the following analysis divides
the sample into industrial, transition (Central and Eastern European), emerging and
developing countries. Reports of empirical results follow this division.1
4.1 CBI among industrial countries
The analysis time span for advanced countries is the longest, and covers annual data
for the years 1970–2007. Among many determinants of inﬂation after World War II,
one may point to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, excessive gov-
ernment spending (and thus, growing deﬁcit and debt-to-GDP ratio, which increased
money holding) or few oil crises with cost-push inﬂation effects.
Figure 1 suggests that, for most of the period, an increased in inﬂation rate was not
caused by an increase in the price of oil. Hence, one may eliminate the cost-push as a
determinant of inﬂation in this group. The general estimated model is of the following
form:
yi;t = a +b1CBIi;t +b2Xi;t +ui;t (1)
Since some data are not available for all country-years, the panel data may be unbal-
anced. Y is the inﬂation rate corresponding with the country and a year; it can be
changed into a transformed inﬂation according to the formula given above. CBI is the
value of CBI degree, which depends not only on the country or a year, but also on the
type of CBI measures used. X is a vector of other explanatory variables, and ui;t is an
i.i.d. disturbance.
Besides theoretical grounds, the ﬁrst choice of regressors was based on a few sim-
ple tests of model selection criteria: R2, or standard errors of regression. The ﬁnal form
of the regression for industrial countries is deﬁned as follows:
yi;t = a +b1CBIi;t +b2yi;t 1+b3dloggdpcapi;t +b4openci;t 1+ui;t (2)
Among many regressors, openness and GDP per capita have been chosen. A large
part of economic literature describes the relation between openness and inﬂation that
justiﬁes this choice (for example Romer 1993). To avoid simultaneity, a second option-
lagged openness-is also considered in the regression. GDP per capita variable, on the
other hand, is used here in terms of ﬁrst-difference to describe the relation between
annual differences in this variable and the inﬂation rate (transformed inﬂation). Both
variables are deﬁned in current prices. One should also notice a lagged dependent
variable that is included as a regressor in order to improve autocorrelation. The results
are reported as follows:
1 Group division of countries in Table A1 in the Appendix is based on IMF classiﬁcation in 2007.
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Figure 1. Inﬂation rates and oil prices: advanced countries
(i) Columns represent single regressions differentiated by the CBI measure.
(ii) List of regressors is placed in rows.
(iii) Additional information describes goodness-of-ﬁt of each regression along with
the type of methodology.
Models are estimated using stacked pooled data. Estimations are done with the ﬁxed
effects and General Least Square (GLS) weights, allowing for heteroskedasticity in
cross-section. To compute standard errors that are robust to serial correlation (Arellano
1987; White 1984) one should choose the White period as the coefﬁcient covariance
method. Estimated GLS (EGLS) is more efﬁcient, compared to the OLS, once one
is willing to make assumptions about the form of heteroskedasticity (Verbeek 2004,
p. 95). The standard errors for the GLS approach are much smaller, so there is an
estimation efﬁciency gain.
In Table 2, at ﬁrst glance, all long-time measures (i.e. those that were calculated
more than once) show an expected sign of a coefﬁcient: negative or positive for the
index PROB. Only updated values of Alesina (done by the authors of this paper) are
insigniﬁcant. This could be generated by possible mistakes in calculations, because
the data was gathered based on other measures. All other CBI indices seem to be good
regressors of transformed inﬂation. None of the “short-time” measures appeared to be
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Table 2. Estimation results: “transformed inﬂation” as a dependent (industrial countries)
LVAU GMTO GMTE GMTP PROB Alesina2
CBI  0.07  0.03  0.11  0.04 0.14  0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
[ 2.87] [ 1.95] [ 4.10] [ 2.43] [3.3] [ 0.34]
di;t 1 0.68 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.65
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
d(log)GDP p.c. 0.69 0.67 0.52 0.63 0.70 0.89
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18)
Openness ( 1)  0.0005  0.0008  0.0005  0.0004  0.0005  0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Constant 0.25 0.24 0.33 0.23 0.20 0.23
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 715 734 734 734 560 420
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
S.E. 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.40
Notes: Fixed effects with GLS cross-section weights and White cross-section coefﬁcient covariance method
used for all regressions. Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, and t-statistics in square brackets. ,
,  indicate results signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Abbreviations (used hereinafter): LVAU legal CBI index by Cukierman et al. (1992); GMTO, GMTE,
GMTP indices by Grilli et al. (1991); PROB index by Krause and Mend´ ez (2008); Alesina2 updated index
originally created by Alesina (1988); di;t 1 transformed inﬂation rate; d(log)GDP p.c. difference in log
GDP per capita; Openness( 1) lagged one period measure of openness.
a regressor that signiﬁcantly explain changes in values of transformed inﬂation.
The next step is reestimation of the model with the use of simple inﬂation rate as a
dependent variable. Moreover, for the sake of better goodness-of-ﬁt and understanding
of the model, GDP per capita is included in its level logged form (without calculating
ﬁrst-difference). This acts as a ﬁrst robustness check, a test of whether CBI measures
keep their explanatory power when the dependent variable is deﬁned differently and
some other regressors change their forms. Table 3 presents the outcome of these esti-
mations:
yi;t = a +b1CBIi;t +b2yi;t 1+b3loggdpcapi;t +b4openci;t 1+ui;t (3)
The model transformation revealed weaknesses among CBI measures. Simple data
modiﬁcation, like a presentation of a dependent variable in its original form, showed
that some indices lost their explanatory power. Two measures-overall GMT index and
its economic deﬁnition-appeared to be again good regressors of inﬂation rate, being
signiﬁcant at the 5% level (although the latter’s coefﬁcient had a much higher stan-
dard error). With a “short-time” group of indices (those whose values do not change
over time) it was possible to estimate simple cross-country models. The ﬁrst original
measures by Bade-Parkin, Alesina and Eijfﬁnger-Schaling performed relatively well
as regressors. They did not only signiﬁcantly differ from zero, but also had smaller
standard errors. Other measures, including TOR and VUL but also measures based on
distance from Germany or OPCBI, did not perform well in this test.
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Table 3. Estimation results: “lagged inﬂation” as a dependent (industrial countries)
LVAU GMTO GMTE GMTP PROB Alesina2
CBI  1.17  0.63  1.59  0.29 1.31  0.18
(0.75) (0.23) (0.68) (0.58) (0.96) (0.43)
[ 1.56] [ 2.74] [ 2.35] [ 0.49] [0.96] [ 0.41]
Inﬂation rate( 1) 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.79 0.76
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(log)GDP p.c.  1.75  1.77  1.64  1.8  1.10  1.35
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.53) (0.87) (0.90)
Openness ( 1) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 16.98 17.47 16.95 17.24 10.59 13.17
4.36 (4.56) (4.40) (4.69) (7.86) (8.28)
Observations 715 734 734 734 560 420
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.83
S.E. 2.08 2.26 2.26 2.26 1.74 1.61
Notes: FixedeffectswithGLScross-sectionweightsandWhitecross-sectioncoefﬁcientcovariancemethod
used for all regressions. Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, and t-statistics in square brackets. ,
,  indicate results signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Since EGLS makes certain assumption about the form of heteroskedasticity, one
can eliminate this assumption and estimate models with a simple Least Squares esti-
mation, keeping ﬁxed effects. This has been performed as well, keeping the original
forms of models. First of all, it was not possible to receive the same outcomes in terms
of CBI measures. Measures by Grilli et al., overall and economic, kept their strong
explanatory power that was signiﬁcantly different from zero with inﬂation rate, as a
dependent variable (no longer with transformed inﬂation, however). Obviously, stan-
dard errors were higher, but the difference was rather small (0.32 for GMT overall).
4.1.1 Some speciﬁcation tests
From panel estimation, one can notice that coefﬁcients of GMTO measure of inde-
pendence were for all the tests signiﬁcantly different from zero, whereas few other
measures suffered from robustness, while the dependent variable was redeﬁned. This
outcome gives incentive to test whether a model, where the GMTO represents a CBI
deﬁnition, should be accepted over all other models.
For this reason and assumption, a J-test for non-nested models has been performed.
In a model with an inﬂation rate, as a dependent variable and Least Square estimation,
all models (“long-time” models) were evaluated in a pair-wise comparison. For exam-
ple, choosing between two speciﬁcations including either GMTO or GMTE followed
the procedure below:
H1 : yi;t = a +b1GMTEi;t +b2yi;t 1+b3loggdpcapi;t +b4openci;t 1+ui;t
H2 : yi;t = a +b1GMTOi;t +b2yi;t 1+b3loggdpcapi;t +b4openci;t 1+ui;t
If ﬁtted values of H2 enter signiﬁcantly in model H1, model H1 can be rejected. How-
ever, if the opposite happens, and ﬁtted values of H1 are signiﬁcant when included in
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H2, model H2 can be rejected as well. This is a drawback of this method: it is possible
to either reject both speciﬁcations or fail to reject both models, at the same time. In
this case, the data do not provide enough information to discriminate between the two
models.
Here, ﬁtted values of GMTO entered signiﬁcantly into all other models with “long-
term” CBI measures (as a reminder: GMTE, GMTP, LVAU, PROB). At the same time,
none of these models’ ﬁtted values were signiﬁcant in the GMTO estimation. Addi-
tionally, considering other pairs, ﬁtted values of GMTE were signiﬁcant in the LVAU
estimation; but the opposite did not happen.
One other test for the explanatory power of competitive variables is to regress the
model that consists of all these elements, for example a model where all regressors are
CBI measures. Table 4 summarises outcomes of these tests. The general idea is the
same: which CBI measure will be signiﬁcantly different from zero in a set of many
similar deﬁnitions. Due to high correlation between GMTO and GMTE (GMTP), the
overall index is eliminated. One should note that GMTP and GMTE have completely
different deﬁnitions and are uncorrelated.
Table 4. Results for industrial countries with CBI as the only regressors
Dependent variable: inﬂation rate Dependent variable: transformed rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GMTE  8.79  1.53 GMTE  0.40  0.15
(1.02) (0.51) (0.03) (0.04)
[ 8.59] [ 2.99] [ 12.39] [ 3.47]
GMTP  5.15  0.63 GMTP  0.06  0.01
(1.25) (0.60) (0.04) (0.02)
[ 4.12] [ 1.05] [ 1.52] [ 0.57]
LVAU 3.55 0.92 LVAU 0.07 0.02
(1.59) (0.87) (0.03) (0.04)
[2.23] [1.05] [2.16] [0.58]
PROB 1.51 0.64 PROB  0.03  0.01
(1.48) (1.61) (0.04) (0.03)
[1.02] [0.39] [ 0.58] [ 0.44]
Lagged inﬂation 0.82 Lagged d 0.64
[13.78] [8.28]
Method LS LS Method GLS GLS
Notes: Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, and t-statistics in square brackets. , ,  indicate
results signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Abbreviations: Least Square (LS); Generalized Least Square (GLS).
Data mining, like averaging of time series, can affect estimation results. It happens
due to loss of information during such data modiﬁcation. For example, in time series
regressions involving quarterly data, such data are often derived from the monthly data
by simply adding three monthly observations and dividing the sum by three. This
averaging introduces smoothness into the data by reducing ﬂuctuations in the monthly
data (Gujarati 2003, p. 447). The presence of outliers and/or inﬂuential points can
dramatically affect the regression line. This means that these points are capable of
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 5, no. 2 143A.A. Maslowska
pulling the regression line toward itself, thus distorting the slope of the regression line.
In order to show effects of both situations, Table 5 presents panel data estimation (only
for CBI measures) based on four periods (averages of decades between 1970–2007),
with or without inﬂuential observation. In general literature on CBI, it is accepted to
believe that Germany and Switzerland could be inﬂuential points. The model is deﬁned
in the same way throughout all estimations.
Table 5. Estimation results for industrial countries using averaged data
GMTO GMTE GMTP LVAU PROB TOR
CBI  9.35  8.30  6.93  8.87 9.15 11.55
(0.79) (0.81) (0.75) (2.31) (1.64) (4.02)
[ 11.76] [ 10.24] [ 9.23] [ 3.83] [5.59] [2.88]
Less D and CH
CBI  9.09  8.04  6.80  8.23 8.3 2.36
(1.00) (1.1) (0.91) (2.84) (1.97) (6.34)
[ 9.01] [ 7.24] [ 7.49] [ 2.89] [4.19] [0.37]
Notes: Least square, ﬁxed effects with White cross-section coefﬁcient covariance method. Coefﬁcients’
standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets. , ,  indicate results signiﬁcant at the 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
Abbreviations (used hereinafter): TOR index created by Cukierman et al. (1992); Less D and CH means
that estimations are without Germany and Switzerland.
Averaging data appears to signiﬁcantly affect the estimations’ results. The key dif-
ference comes from the fact that now all measures have perfect explanatory power of
the change in inﬂation across countries and time. Not only do legal measures of inde-
pendence matter, but so do those so-called “actual” measures connected with a change
(or probability of a change) of a CB governor. Much higher coefﬁcients (often, ten
times larger than produced in the annual analysis) can be connected with the data mod-
iﬁcation; now, CBI is related to decennial change in inﬂation rate. However, comparing
annual versus decennial data analysis, one should notice much larger standard errors
of estimated coefﬁcients in the latter type, especially with LVAU, PROB and TOR.
Elimination of inﬂuential points does not bring big differences in estimations. Coef-
ﬁcients values decrease slightly, standard errors increase, but all the measures have
strong explanatory power, except the turnover rate of governors.
4.2 CBI in emerging markets
A few emerging markets, especially those from Latin America, are characterised with
short periods of very high inﬂation (Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for some
countries). Argentina, Brazil or Peru are countries where the inﬂation rate was mea-
sured in thousands of percentage points (its annual change). As explained earlier, one
of the solutions to these data is to represent a dependent variable as a transformed in-
ﬂation, as suggested by Cukierman (1992). This treatment, however, as pointed out
by J´ acome and V´ azquez (2005), has an undesirable effect of bounding the dependent
variable in the interval [0,1]. For this reason, the alternative measure, log(k+p) is
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applied. The variable k is a positive number that helps avoid ﬁnding a logarithm from
a negative number. Because of Thailand’s example with a negative inﬂation rate of
 9:5% in the 1990, k is number 10.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of inﬂation for selected emerging countries
Country Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Argentina 28 295.17 709.29  1.17 3079.46
Brazil 28 424.54 760.02 3.21 2947.73
Chile 28 12.71 9.66 1.06 35.14
Peru 28 461.02 1518.67 0.16 7481.69
Thailand 28 4.01 4.73  9.50 19.70
Venezuela 28 30.62 22.63 6.24 99.88
Availability of data on CBI in emerging markets allows to perform this analysis for
the years 1980–2007. The estimated model looks different than the one for industrial
countries, for example. One ﬁnds it reasonable to include certain variables describ-
ing institutional developments among emerging countries. These can relate to political
regimes, like the number of veto players in the parliament (checks and balances), or
can describe economic conditions, such as presence of banking sector reforms, for
example. Among many such variables, the ﬁnal model includes a level of world inﬂa-
tion rate, a dummy variable for periods of hyperinﬂation and a variable describing the
degree of economic freedom:
logyit = a +b1CBIit +b2logyit 1+b3Worldinﬂationt 1 (4)
+b4DummyHyperinﬂationit +b5Econfreedomit +ui;t
A dummy for hyperinﬂation considers countries and periods when inﬂation was
above certain level. This level can be set arbitrarily. However, an example given by
Peltonen (2006) has been used: hyperinﬂation when average inﬂation rate is above
40%. An index of economic freedom has been constructed by the Fraser Institute
(Gwartney et al. 2006). The index comprises 21 components designed to identify the
consistency of institutional arrangements and policies with economic freedom in ﬁve
major areas: size of government; legal structure and security of property rights; access
to sound money; freedom to trade internationally; and regulation of credit, labor and
business. The index ranges from 0–10, where 0 corresponds to less economic freedom
and 10 to more economic freedom.
The estimation procedure starts with the simple bivariate model, where CBI mea-
sure is the only regressor. This is done, although not reported here, to verify results
obtained from previous studies. Many of the ﬁrst studies use the CBI index as the only
independent variable and obtain signiﬁcant results describing a relation between higher
CBI degree and lower inﬂation rates. These outcomes were also conﬁrmed here. In
bivariate models, all ﬁve measures (TOR, GMTE, GMTP, GMTO and LVAU) have a
strong explanatory power of inﬂation levels among emerging markets.
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Table 7. Estimation results for emerging markets: log inﬂation as a dependent
LVAU GMTO GMTE GMTP TOR TOR
CBI  1.02  0.10  0.13 0.04 0.37 0.34
(0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
[ 1.57] [ 1.14] [ 2.85] [0.47] [4.20] [3.72]
logI( 1) 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.62 0.65
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
[7.05]
WI( 1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)
[1.71]
Obs. 450 450 450 450 450
LVAU GMTO GMTE GMTP TOR
CBI  0.07  0.16  0.12 0.01 0.59
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
[ 0.88] [ 1.85] [ 2.65] [0.19] [6.48]
Hyperinﬂation 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.51
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.089] [0.08] [2.81]
CBI 0.06 0.02  0.02 0.11* 0.49
[0.79] [0.25] [ 0.55] [1.80] [5.87]
Econfreedom  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.05  0.06
[ 3.46]
Method 2SLS/EGLS
Notes: Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets. , ,  indicate results
signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Abbreviations: natural logarithm of inﬂation (logI ); world inﬂation (WI); dummy for countries and years
with inﬂation rate over 40% (Hyperinﬂation); index of economic freedom (Econfreedom); Two Stage Least
Square (2SLS).
One treatment to account for the possible endogeneity in the regression is the use of
instrumental variables. A method of Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) has been used,
the result of which can be found in the last column of Table 7. When the turnover rate
of governors as a CBI proxy is used, as before the results indicate that inﬂation in the
sampled countries is positively correlated with world inﬂation, negatively correlated
with the index of economic freedom and positively correlated (as expected) with the
measure of CBI. The list of instruments include lagged inﬂation (lags 2, 3), economic
freedom indicator (lags 1, 2), world inﬂation rate (lag 2), dummy for hyper inﬂation
(lag 1) and one period lag of TOR.
After checking the robustness of the estimation by including explanatory variables,
it is again time to re-deﬁne the dependent variable and use the variable d-transformed
inﬂation values. The procedure is repeated; analysis starts with bivariate models to
end the model, including both index of economic freedom and a dummy for hyperin-
ﬂation. Effects of CBI measures are now smaller, in the sense that only turnover of
governors scores the expected sign and is signiﬁcantly different from zero for most of
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the estimation’s transformations. For simplicity, Table 8 reports values only for CBI
indices.
Table 8. Estimation results for emerging markets: “transformed inﬂation” as a dependent
Dependent: d LVAU GMTO GMTE GMTP TOR
CBI  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.02 0.15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
[ 2.82] [ 2.18] [ 2.48] [ 0.85] [4.19]
With d( 1) and world inﬂation
CBI  0.001 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07
( 0.041) (1.82) (0.68) (2.09) (3.08)
[0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03]
Notes: Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets. , ,  indicate results
signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
It is also possible to do another type of robustness analysis. Certainly, it is by
now obvious that estimation outcomes depend on the type of countries. The relation
between degree of CBI and inﬂation rate is much stronger among advanced countries
than emerging ones, for example. This strength lies mainly in the fact that this relation
is visible with many different deﬁnitions of CBI.
4.2.1 CBI in a few Latin American countries
Among emerging markets, it is plausible to distinguish a separate group of countries.
Some papers, such as J´ acome and V´ asquez (2005), for example, focus only on Latin
American countries. Here, those countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico
and Venezuela. Therefore, the following analysis will include only these six countries.
Table 6 with descriptive statistics for these countries, clearly indicates that almost
all of them experienced periods of hyperinﬂation. In the 1990s, these countries ex-
perienced waves of currency and banking crises. Mexico registered major exchange
rate devaluations in both in the 1980s and 1990s. Argentina and Venezuela faced ad-
ditional banking crises in 2002 and 1994–1995, respectively. At the same time, many
of these countries had undergone fundamental changes to their political and economic
structures since the 1980s.
Increasing degrees of central bank independence aimed to create a credible mes-
sage to the public concerning a reduction in inﬂation rates. Prior to the 1990s, for
example, Mexico suffered bursts of inﬂation after several failed inﬂation-ﬁghting pro-
grammes (Gould and Marion 1998). Figure 2 presents a history of inﬂation rate with,
vertical lines marking years in which an anti-inﬂation programme was introduced. As
Figure 2 shows, during the 1970s and 1980s, anti-inﬂation programmes implemented
at inﬂation peaks were eventually abandoned, succeeded by a new acceleration of in-
ﬂation rate.



























Source: IMF statistics and Gould and Marion (1998)
Figure 2. Inﬂation rate in Mexico
Past and recent experience of governors of the Central Bank of Argentina prove
that changing legislation is not enough for the rule to be enforced. In fact, central bank
governor, Martin Redrado was recently dismissed from his position for refusing to
repay the country’s international debt from the central bank’s funds. This is an example
of the discrepancy between legal and actual degree of central bank independence, often
observed in non-advanced countries. The above analysis has shown that the turnover
rate of governors, an example of the measure of the actual degree of CBI, is mainly
(if not solely) signiﬁcantly able to explain changes in the level of inﬂation among
emerging markets. J´ acome and V´ asquez (2005) showed that, in some cases, legal
measures can also be a reliable independent variable among Latin American countries.
Table 9 summarizes the veriﬁcation of these hypothesis and results.
In a group of six Latin American countries, all CBI indices appear to have a strong
explanatory power of inﬂation rate. Not only TOR, but all legal measures have their
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Table 9. Estimation results for selected emerging markets
Dependent: log inﬂation LVAU GMTO GMTE GMTP TOR
CBI  0.84  0.47  0.29  0.50 0.40
(0.27) (0.17) (0.11) (0.24) (0.18)
[ 3.16] [ 2.74] [ 2.73] [ 2.14] [2.23]
log yi;t 1 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.57
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
World inﬂation( 1) 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.005* 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hyperinﬂation 0.59 0.71 0.67 0.73 0.78
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150
CBI  0.65  0.37  0.22  0.40 0.26
[ 2.57] [ 2.66] [ 2.64] [ 1.97] [1.92]
Econfreedom  0.06  0.09  0.0989  0.11  0.09
[ 0.92] [ 1.59] [ 1.66] [ 1.87] [ 1.44]
Notes: Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets. , ,  indicate results
signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
estimated coefﬁcients signiﬁcantly different from zero. It remains so even after includ-
ing another independent variable—economic freedom index.
4.2.2 Some speciﬁcation tests
Estimations results for emerging markets and a narrow group of Latin American coun-
tries show that the effect of central bank independence on the inﬂation rate was slightly
different. While only a few CBI indices turn out to be signiﬁcant regressors among
nineteen varying countries (from Argentina, through India to South Africa), all ﬁve
measures enter signiﬁcant (and with expected signs) regressions for Latin America.
To test the robustness of these results, especially the strength of CBI measures
explanatory power, a few tests are performed: a J-test for non-nested models, a model
including only CBI measures and a stepwise selection of these measures. For all tests,
log inﬂation is the dependent variable.
The J-test for non-nested models is performed in the same way as the one for indus-
trial countries. Regressions include lagged dependent variable, lagged world inﬂation
rate, dummy variable for hyperinﬂation and a measure of economic freedom. The ﬁrst
tests included all nineteen emerging markets. The hypothesis that the model with TOR
is one of the regressors is accepted; ﬁtted values of TOR entered signiﬁcantly into all
other models. Additionally, economic measure of GMT was able to exclude the model
with its political counterpart.
As explained, estimation results were slightly different for only six Latin Ameri-
can countries. Therefore, the J-test for non-nested models is repeated for this group.
From the original estimation results, it has been determined that economic freedom has
a weaker explanatory power. At ﬁrst, this variable was excluded from the regression
during the test. As a result, only the legal measure of independence LVAU entered
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signiﬁcantly (though, at the 5% level) into all competing models. Reinserting the eco-
nomic freedom variable weakened the effect of LVAU, and it was not possible to point
at any model to be accepted.
The next two tests are similar in assumptions. Both accept only CBI measures as
regressors. The summary of results from estimations, including only measures taken
altogether, can be found in Table 10. Again, GMTO is excluded, being in the strongest
correlation with both its sections: economic and political. The Durbin-Watson statistic
(0.55), as expected, indicates positive autocorrelation.
Table 10. Estimation results for selected emerging markets: CBI as regressors
Dependent: log inﬂation LVAU GMTE GMTP TOR
 1.53  1.01 1.51 1.46
[ 3.02] [ 2.76] [4.51] [3.61]
Notes: t-statistics in square brackets.
The estimation coefﬁcients are obtained with the Least Squares method but, Gener-
alised LS has supported these results. Among all estimations, the positive (unexpected)
sign of GMT political is the most surprising. As a reminder, it describes procedures for
appointing and dismissal of the central bank’s governor and the Monetary Policy Com-
mittee. In this way, it is related to the turnover rate of governors, which also describes
the change in the ofﬁce of the CB governor. Although the TOR’s construction deter-
mines that the relation with inﬂation rate is expected to be positive, values of GMTP
are expected to produce a negative coefﬁcient of estimation.
A stepwise selection method of regression indicates clearly that it is again TOR
that is included as the ﬁrst regressor with adjusted R2 at the level of 0.24. LVAU is
included in the next step improving the regression ﬁt by 0.03, whereas GMTP enters
in the third place, again with a positive sign. All in all, it indicates that in a group
of emerging markets it is a measure of the “actual” independence (TOR) that explains
changes in the inﬂation rate most accurately.
4.3 CBI among developing countries
The group comprising all developing countries is very diversiﬁed. In fact, it includes
approximately seventy countries, among which it is possible to create several sub-
groups. Very few measures have been calculated for these countries. It is reasonable
(based on the size sample) to include only two: TOR and the overall GMT index. Both
represent two completely different deﬁnitions of central bank independence, so it is
rational to perform a comparison between these two. These measures also allow for
the analysis within the years 1980–2007.
Looking at the list of countries in Table A1 in the Appendix, one notices a wide
variety among them. One common characteristic is a rather unstable political situation
among these nations. Many of them have recorded periods of hyperinﬂation, whereas
some have had years of negative inﬂation. Several summarising statistics regarding the
inﬂation rate can be found in Table 11.
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics of inﬂation for selected developing countries
Country Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Cambodia 21 30.46 55.89  31.25 191.00
Haiti 28 10.55 23.14  95.44 42.56
Maldives 28 6.47 7.67  9.16 27.88
Mozambique 28 30.93 32.06 1.49 164.12
Nicaragua 24 83.01 206.80 3.70 885.20
In a group of countries with such a large variance in their inﬂation rate, it is difﬁcult
to ﬁnd a proper representation. Nevertheless, it is believed that a transformed measure
of inﬂation, d =inﬂation rate=(1+inﬂation rate), would well represent changes in the
inﬂation rate (with a natural logarithm of inﬂation rate as a robustness check).
The choice of explanatory variables in the following estimations was based on a
condition of the (in)stability of economies. A level of GDP per capita or a degree of
openness may have rather limited effect in countries affected by many political and/or
military conﬂicts. For this reason, one of the considered variables is the number of
conﬂicts in which the government of the country is involved, from UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conﬂict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). This variable’s minimum value is (0) and the
maximum depends on the number of observed conﬂicts in a single year (very often
it is (1), but not always). It is expected that a larger number of conﬂicts introduces
destabilisation in the market and may be positively correlated with a higher inﬂation
rate. A measure describing a degree of economic freedom is also considered in the
model.
Finally there are two alternative models, for which estimation results can be found
in Table 12. One includes proxies for conﬂict and economic freedom. The second
replaces economic freedom with a dummy for hyperinﬂation and a possible effect of
world inﬂation on the domestic rate.
Estimations, where a natural logarithm of inﬂation rate is the dependent variable,
are performed using a Least Square estimator. Results are rather unstable in this group
of countries. Therefore, estimations are also repeated with a GLS method. Again, sur-
prisingly in respect to theory and previous studies claiming that TOR is the right proxy
for developing countries, its coefﬁcient records a negative sign (although it depends on
the model and method used). GLS, in general, is able to “produce” the expected sign
for TOR. In comparison with previous studies, Cukierman et al. (1992) reported a ne-
gative relationship between legal CBI and inﬂation for industrial countries, but failed
to obtain similar results for developing countries. De Haan and Kooi (2000), using
the turnover of central bank governors as a more direct measure of effective CBI for a
sample of 82 countries in the 1980s, also failed to ﬁnd a robust relationship between
CBI and inﬂation.
Results of estimations with a transformed inﬂation rate as the dependent variable
are quite similar to previous ones. GMT, again, proves to be a good regressor of the
modiﬁed inﬂation rate. Now, TOR looses the negative sign in all estimations. It enters
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the model signiﬁcantly, however, only with a hyperinﬂation dummy and values for the
world inﬂation rate.
Table 12. Results for industrial countries with CBI as the only regressors
Dependent variable: log inﬂation Dependent variable: transformed inﬂation
GMT TOR GMT TOR
CBI  0.14  0.01 CBI  0.15 0.03
(0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
[ 2.07] [ 0.88] [ 2.33] [2.25]
Inﬂation( 1) 0.67 0.49 Transformed 0.63 0.48
(0.13) (0.05) inﬂation( 1) (0.11) (0.04)
Conﬂict 0.05 0.005 Conﬂict 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.006) (0.01) (0.005)
Econfreedom  0.04  0.02 Hyperinﬂation 0.06 0.11
(0.01) (0.003) (0.05) (0.06)
World inﬂation 0.002 0.001
(0.0007) (0.0002)
Obs. 728 859 919 1134
Countries 47 36 63 48
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.99 0.63 0.99
Method LS GLS LS GLS
Notes: Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets. , ,  indicate results
signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Abbreviation: Conﬂict is measure of number of conﬂicts in the region.
Table 13. Estimation results for developing countries using instrumental methods










Notes: 2SLS/EGLS method. Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in
square brackets. , ,  indicate results signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Again, similar to the analysis for emerging markets, one may use the IV-estimation
method. Results of the TSLS estimation method are included in Table 13. In a simple
model, both measures prove to be good regressors of the dependent variable, showing
that the degree of CBI also matters for the inﬂation rate among developing countries.
The list of instruments includes lagged inﬂation (lags 2, 3), world inﬂation rate (lag 1),
dummy for hyper inﬂation (lag 1), a measure of number of conﬂicts (lag 1) and one
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period lag of the CBI measure. All in all, one can conclude that the group of developing
countries is so diversiﬁed, with so many unstable regimes, that results are very much
dependent on the list of other variables included in the model.
4.4 CBI in transition countries
Former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been in the centre
of research interest since the beginning of the 1990s. One result of this research is the
creation of a large number of CBI measures. Besides “standard” measures, such as
LVAU or GMT, the literature provides indices such as the modiﬁed legal index LVES
(Cukierman et al. 2002), an index of CB independence and accountability calculated
for former Soviet Union republics (Lybek), or two indices constructed by Loungani et
al. (1997) that include only twelve transition countries.
The period of the analysis is relatively short (1990–2007), but ongoing institutional
changes give opportunity to distinguish two periods: before and after introducing new
central bank acts. New CB legislation had not been introduced right away in all coun-
tries. In some of them, such as Poland, the major increase in CB independence took
place in 1997. However, there is a large number of measures that were calculated only
once, and for this reason, a cross-section analysis will be the major one.
The political and economic regime change and the process of democratisation also
affected the quality of statistical data. In some cases, deﬁnitions of observed variables
have changed several times. For example, countries currently within the European
Union need to follow European statistical standards. These all have an effect on the
precision of data. For this reason, and to avoid a large amount of variability in statistics
due to the change in deﬁnitions, an analysis is performed on the averaged data. One
obvious justiﬁcation for additional modiﬁcation of the sample is the European Union
membership of some countries. This allows transition countries to be divided into
one group with total number of countries and another including only EU members
(members as of January 2009). However, one may never be sure if an anti-inﬂationary
process undertaken among the newest EU members was due to an increased degree of
CBI, or due to the general adjustment process required before the membership.
To beneﬁt from including all CBI measures prepared for transition countries, sim-
ple cross-country estimations are performed, with averaged data in the period 1995–
2005. It is necessary to state that estimation coefﬁcientsare very vulnerable to a change
in the model. A few “political” variables, which are typically used (as described ear-
lier) in estimations, did not enter signiﬁcantly into the model and did not improve
goodness-of-ﬁt of the estimation. Table 14 presents the results of the model:
log(inﬂation rate)i = a +b1CBIi+b2log(GDP p.c.)i+b3opennessi (5)
A cross-country analysis is done at the particular point of time. It includes averaged
data and only one value of CBI. Therefore, it is not as informative as panel data, where
“before-and-after” recorded data help to compare different periods in time. Table 14
has therefore limited value-added, although, as stated, many previous studies on CBI
were based on this kind of estimation.
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Table 14. Estimation results for transition countries
GMTO GMTE GMTP LVAW LVES TORMAS
CBI  4.18  3.14  2.87  1.55  1.62 5.35
(0.89) (0.69) (1.11) (1.00) (0.93) (1.04)
[ 4.7] [ 4.49] [ 2.59] [ 1.55] [ 1.74] [5.12]
GDP p.c.  0.58  0.47  0.72  0.59  0.54  0.82
[ 4.46] [ 3.15] [ 4.86] [ 3.64] [ 2.67] [ 5.57]
Openness 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01**
[2.58] [2.17] [2.05] [1.91] [1.48] [2.22]
Obs. 25 25 25 25 21 18
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.45 0.48 0.35 0.26 0.65
D-W 1.7 1.7 1.42 1.34 1.3 2.1
Freytag CBIAccount CBIDF SIB CBI Index
CBI  4.5  0.16  0.29 0.33  0.38
(1.42) (0.06) (1.07) (1.8) (1.72)
[ 3.16] [ 2.87] [ 0.27] [0.18] [ 0.22]
GDP p.c.  2.70  0.37  0.82  0.81  0.95
[ 6.33] [ 2.48] [ 2.56] [ 2.05] [ 1.83]
Openness 0.02 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.00
[3.46] [0.46] [0.43] [0.32] [0.004]
Obs. 10 15 12 12 13
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.48 0.06 0.05 0.14
D-W 1.35 2.9 0.46 0.49 0.99
Notes: Coefﬁcients’ standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets. White hetero-
skedasticity-consistent standard errors. , ,  indicate results signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Abbreviations: LVAW, LVES indices by Cukierman et al. (1992); TORMAS index by Cukierman et
al. (1992) updated by Maslowska; Freytag constructed by Freytag (2003); CBIAccount index by Lybek
(1999); CBIDF and SIB constructed by Loungani and Sheets (1997); CBIIndex by Freytag and Mascian-
daro (2005).
Estimated coefﬁcients, as well as information on the goodness-of-ﬁt of regres-
sions, indicate that several measures do not have much explanatory power. These
are measures by Loungani et al. (1997; CBIDF and SIB), index formulated by Frey-
tag and Masciandaro (CBI-Index) or legal measures constructed by Cukierman et al.
(1992) and Cukierman et al. (2002)—LVAW and LVES. After eliminating countries
that recorded average inﬂation rate above 40%, few measures recorded signiﬁcant and
expected coefﬁcients: GMTO, GMTP and TOR.
5. Conclusions
The major goal of this paper, choosing the most adequate CBI deﬁnition, is done by
the empirical veriﬁcation of impact on economy. The value added factor of this work is
gathering and comparing various measures of independence. Moreover, although this
paper is titled “Quest for the Best”, indicating a “contest” among CBI measures, its
general idea was to test if the strong negative relationship between CBI and inﬂation
rate holds with the new data and new estimations’ methods.
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In the special edition of the European Journal of Political Economy, devoted to the
phenomenon of central bank independence, Siklos (2008) argues that CBI should be
interpreted as a collection of characteristics that are related to inﬂation. Consequently,
he claims, there is no single deﬁnition of CBI that is “right” for all countries. This
paper reaches the same conclusions after performing several empirical tests.
Measures of central bank autonomy offer a useful expression of the extent to which
a central bank is able to keep the government away from inﬂuencing a change in the
inﬂation rate. The more a measure represents this idea, the more easily one can ﬁnd
a relation between the CBI value and the inﬂation rate. For example, after many esti-
mations, one can notice that proxies by Grilli et al. are very often strong regressors of
inﬂation rate, contrary to those by Cukierman et al. This explanatory strength of GMT
can be explained by the fact that existing indices, with the exception of the GMT index,
tend to focus excessively on statutory aspects of CBI, while omitting non-statutory fac-
tors that inﬂuence the de facto degree of CBI (Siklos 2008). Therefore, it should come
as no surprise that the measure of de facto CBI proves to be a signiﬁcant explanatory
variable among many countries where statutory aspects of CB autonomy matter to a
lesser extent.
The group of advanced countries is the strongest example that the process of disin-
ﬂation has been accompanied by the increasing degree of central bank independence.
Long time span, several recorded changes in the degree of CBI with the upward trend
and (despite ﬁnancial turbulences at the beginning of the 1990s) decreasing inﬂation
rate, all prove to be signiﬁcant in the search for a negative relation between CBI and in-
ﬂation. All measures performed as expected, indicating a negative relationship. How-
ever, additional tests of non-nested models showed that ﬁtted values only for GMTO
entered signiﬁcantly into all other models, proving to be “superior” to all other CBI
measures in this type of regressions.
The turnover rate of governors, the measure of so-called “actual” CBI, has proven
to be a good regressor of inﬂation among emerging markets. Not surprisingly, after
all, these countries’ quality of democratic institutions should be described rather by
the actual practice, not legal acts. More interestingly, however, measures of legal in-
dependence appeared to be rather good regressors within a group of Latin emerging
countries. In a group of six Latin American countries, all CBI indices appear to have
strong explanatory power of inﬂation rate. Not only TOR, but also all legal measures
have their estimated coefﬁcients signiﬁcantly different from zero. It remained so even
after including another independent variable—the economic freedom index. However,
additional tests such as the J-test for non-nested models pointed to the TOR as the most
accurate deﬁnition of central bank independence.
Analysis for developing and transition countries was rather limited, but gave some
interesting outcomes. First of all, only two measures, TOR and GMT, provided data for
a group of approximately 70 developing countries. Between these two measures, TOR
estimated coefﬁcients were rather vulnerable to applied tests. On the other hand, GMT
proved to be a rather good regressor of inﬂation, even after the model’s modiﬁcations.
This type of measure also had a strong explanatory power within transition countries.
Many other measures, including Loungani (1997), Eijfﬁnger and Schaling (1995) or
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measures by Cukierman et al. (1992, 2002), did not manage to prove that there is a
negative relation between a degree of CBI and inﬂation rate in transition countries.
The analysis performed by Cukierman (1992), which led him to the conclusion that
institutional differences among countries matter, not the measure used in the analysis,
is one of the most inﬂuential in the history of studies on CBI and its relations with
inﬂation. At the moment of his study, a limited number of CBI measures was available.
One of the aims of this paper was to challenge this opinion. With considerably long
time series and large cross-country data, as well as varying tests, it was possible to at
least hint the idea that one may also obtain contradictory results within one sample of
countries, when using “competing” CBI measures.
This study assumes that a proxy can become a good approximation of the deﬁnition
if it is not vulnerable to data or speciﬁcation change. It can be seen already within
a rather homogenous group of industrial countries that some indices perform “better”
than others. For example, legal proxies by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini performed
in the majority of tests as expected, while measures by Cukierman et al. (LVAU and
TOR) were vulnerable to changes in the estimated models.
TheseresultsquestionthecorrectnessofthefactthatthemostpopularCBImeasure
used for further analysis is the legal measure by Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et
al. (1992), as reported recently by Klomp and de Haan (2010). The analysis presented
here shows that there is no reason why this measure would be chosen more often than
others, except for the usual argument that Cukierman’s measure provides data for a
larger number of countries and longer time series. This measure’s major “rival” (i.e.,
the legal measure by Grilli et al. 1991) performed better in the statistical point of view.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of countries: IMF classiﬁcation based on 2007
Industrial countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, the United States
Transition countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Emerging countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan,
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela
Developing countries: Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape
Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sene-
gal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Su-
dan, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vietnam,
Zambia
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Table A2. Data sources of CBI measures
Variables for CBI index Source
GMTO, GMTE and GMTP Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and update
from Arnone et al. (2004)
LVAU Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al. (1992) and update
from Arnone et al. (2004)
TOR and VUL Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al. (1992) and update
from Sturm and de Haan (2001)
TORMAS author’s own calculation in 2007
PROB Krause and M´ endez (2007)
BP Bade and Parkin (1988)
Alesina Alesina (1988, 1989)
Alesina2 Alesina (1988, 1989) and author’s own update
ES Eijfﬁnger and Schaling (1993)
Distance Fratianni and Huang (1994)
CBI-Index Freytag and Masciandaro (2005)
OPCBI-N Eijfﬁnger and Schaling (1995)
CBI-DF Loungani and Sheets (1997)
SIB Loungani and Sheets (1997)
OI - overall independence Maliszewski (2000)
Freytag Freytag (2003)
CBI-Account Lybek (1999)
Table A3. Data sources of variables
Variables for independent variables Source
Inﬂation rate OECD, IMF
World inﬂation rate IMF
Hyper inﬂation dummy Own calculations
GDP and GDP/capita (current prices) OECD and IMF
Openness (current prices) Penn World Tables
Economic freedom Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson 2006)
No of Conﬂicts UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset (Gled-
itsch et al. 2002)
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